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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920115-CA 
v. t Priority No. 16 
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER : 
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER, 
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L. : 
MILLER and JON J. BUNDERSON, 
• 
Defendants/Appellees, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES CAROLYN SMITH AND 
BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (effective January 1, 1992) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Johnson's claims against Carolyn Smith, a 
state employee, and Bear River Social Services, a state agency, are 
barred because he failed to give timely notice of his claims as 
required by section 63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
This is a question of law, on which the decision below is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the 
trial court's view of the law." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether Bear River Social Services is immune from 
liability under section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act for a claim for injuries allegedly caused by the disclosure of 
a death threat to the police. 
This is a question of law, on which the decision below is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the 
trial court's view of the law." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether Carolyn Smith was immune from liability for 
Johnson's claims under 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act where Johnson failed to allege that she acted with fraud or 
malice. 
This is a question of law, on which the decision below is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness, giving "no deference to the 
trial court's view of the law." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Bloomauist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 (1989 Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-4(4) 
(1989 Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-10 (effective until July 1, 1990) (1989 
Repl. Vol 7A); 63-30-11(4)(a) (1989 Repl. Vol 7A); and 63-30-12 
(1989 Repl. Vol 7A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal and judgment 
dated September 30, 1991 of the First Judicial District Court in 
and for Box Elder County, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell presiding. 
Course of the Proceedings 
On July 6, 1990, Johnson filed a complaint against 
Carolyn Smith, Bear River Social Services, Mary Miller, Douglas 
Miller, Michael L. Miller and Jon J. Bunderson purporting to state 
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various claims. On September 21, 1990, Smith filed a motion to 
dismiss, which was granted by the court as to Smith and Bear River 
Social Services by order dated July 5, 1991. A final order 
dismissing all of Johnson's claims against all defendants was 
entered by the court on September 30, 1991. 
Disposition Below 
On September 30, 1991, the court entered an order 
dismissing Johnson's complaint against all defendants and entering 
a judgment of $1,826.91 for Bunderson against Johnson for attorneys 
fees and costs. 
Statement of Facts 
On July 6, 1990, Gordon E. Johnson filed a complaint 
alleging that Carolyn Smith, a secretary at Bear River Social 
Services, "breached a confidential relationship" when on about June 
28, 1988, she "turned plaintiff's Reapplication For Assistance [a 
medicaid application form] over to the police." R. 1-10. The 
application form contained a handwritten note stating, "On July 20, 
1988, I will be in jail for killing an attorney, judge & doctor." 
R. 5. Johnson alleged that the disclosure of the note caused him 
to be convicted of assault on a public official, a class B 
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-313 (1988). R. 7.1 
On September 21, 1990, Smith filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint on the ground that (1) Johnson's claims were barred 
by section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requiring 
Johnson attached to his complaint a copy of the first page of 
an unpublished memorandum decision of this Court affirming his 
conviction. 
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that notice of a claim against a governmental agency or employee be 
filed with the attorney general and the agency within one year 
after the claim arises, and (2) Johnson did not allege that Smith 
had acted with fraud or malice and therefore she was protected from 
personal liability by section 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. R. 47-63. 
In response to that motion, Johnson claimed that (1) he 
gave notice of his claim by sending a copy of the complaint to 
Smith by telefacsimile within a month after the termination of his 
probation in November 1989, (2) the notice period was tolled by his 
mental incompetence and because he had been on probation, and (3) 
he could amend his complaint to add the word "malicious." R. 64, 
213-14. 
On July 5, 1991, the court entered an order granting 
Smith's motion and dismissing the action against both Smith and 
Bear River Social Services. R. 209-10. On September 16, 1991, the 
court issued a memorandum decision affirming its dismissal of Smith 
and Bear River Social Services. A final order of dismissal of all 
claims against all defendants was entered on September 30, 1991. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Johnson's claims against both Bear River Social Services, 
a state agency, and Smith, its employee, are barred for failure to 
file a notice of claim in accordance with section 63-30-12 of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Johnson's claim that he gave 
notice to Smith fails to satisfy the requirements of section 63-30-
12 because (1) no notice was filed with the Attorney General as 
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expressly required by that section and (2) the notice was 
admittedly given over one year Johnson's claims arose. The time 
for filing notice was not tolled by Johnson's probation or mental 
incompetence where Johnson failed to apply to the court for an 
extension of time in which to file his notice as required by 
section 63-30-11(4) of the Act. Moreover, Johnson's claimed mental 
problems did not relate to the time period in question and did not 
meet the standard for a finding of "incompetency" for purposes of 
tolling the statute of limitations. Johnson's probation did not 
constitute ground for an extension in any event. 
In addition, Bear River Social Services is immune from 
Johnson's state tort law claim. Section 63-30-3 of the Act 
contains a broad grant of immunity to all governmental entities, 
and none of the waivers of that immunity contained other provisions 
of the Act apply here. Section 63-30-10, which waives immunity for 
negligence claims, is inapplicable because Johnson's injuries 
allegedly arose from the intentional reporting of a death threat to 
the police, rather than merely negligent conduct. 
Smith is immune from liability under section 63-30-4(4) 
of the Act absent fraud or malice. Johnson did not allege either 
fraud or malice in his complaint. Moreover, Johnson never filed an 
amended complaint, although he could have amended his complaint as 
a matter of right under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The trial court's order dismissing Johnson's claims 
against Smith and Bear River Social Services should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST SMITH AND BEAR 
RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES ARE BARRED FOR FAILURE 
TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AS REQUIRED BY THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Section 63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et sea. (1989 Repl. Vol 7A), provides as 
follows: 
A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any 
extension of time granted under Section 63-30-
11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Bear River Social Services is a division of the Utah 
Department of Social Services, a state agency. As alleged in 
Johnson's complaint, Smith is a secretary at Bear River Social 
Services. Thus, the notice requirement of section 63-30-12 applies 
to Johnson's claims of "breach of confidentiality" against Smith 
and Bear River Social Services.2 
2In his brief, Johnson cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it is 
unclear what argument he intends to make based on that provision. 
Appellant's Brief at 7. The notice of claim requirement of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to section 1983 
claims. Edwards v. Hare, 682 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1988). 
However, although Johnson also cited section 1983 below, he never 
pled, or sought leave to amend to plead, such a claim in this case. 
Rather, Johnson's complaint cited Peterson v. Idaho First National 
Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961), a case which addressed the state 
common law tort of invasion of privacy. R. 1. 
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Johnson claims that he provided the required notice by 
sending a copy of the complaint to Smith by facsimile in November 
1989. This alleged notice was defective for at least two reasons: 
first, it was not filed with the Attorney General and, second, it 
was not filed within a year after the claim arose. 
Section 63-30-12 expressly requires that notice be sent 
to both the agency and the Attorney General. Therefore, even if 
the facsimile to Smith could be considered notice properly filed 
with the agency, Johnson failed to file a notice with the Attorney 
General and his action against both Smith and Bear River Social 
Services is therefore barred. 
The Utah Supreme Court has strictly construed the 
requirements of section 63-30-12 and the parallel provision at 
section 63-30-13 for notice of claims against political 
subdivisions. For example, in Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990), the Court upheld the denial of the plaintiff's 
motion for leave to amend her complaint for trespass and assault to 
add claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution after the one 
year deadline. The plaintiff had filed a notice of claim which 
referred generally to "the actions of certain police officers" on 
a specified date and alleged that the officers "physically beat" 
the plaintiff. The Court held that the proposed amendment would 
have done "violence" to the requirement of section 63-30-
11(3)(a)(ii) that the notice of claim set forth "the nature of the 
claim asserted." Id. 
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Similarly, in Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975), the Court held that oral notice to the 
school principal and the principal's written report to the school 
district did not satisfy the notice of claim requirement of section 
63-30-13, stating, "We have consistently held that where a cause of 
action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its 
requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a 
suit." Id. See also Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 
1977); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 1975); Varoz 
v. Sevev, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P. 2d 435, 436 (Utah 1973) ("Actual 
knowledge of the circumstances which resulted in the death of the 
plaintiff's mother by officials of the county does not dispense 
with the necessity of filing a timely claim.") 
Here, the statute expressly requires the notice of claim 
to be filed with the Attorney General in addition to the agency. 
Johnson failed to file any such notice and therefore the trial 
court's dismissal of his complaint must be affirmed.3 
Johnson's alleged notice to Smith is also fatally 
defective because it was untimely. Recognizing this defect, 
Johnson contends that the time period for filing a notice of claim 
was tolled because: (1) he was on probation between October 1988 
and October 1989 and believed that initiating the lawsuit would 
3In Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp., 28 Utah 2d 396, 
398-99, 503 P.2d 446, 448 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege compliance 
with section 63-30-12. As a condition precedent to filing suit, 
Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975), 
the filing of the notice of claim must be affirmatively alleged. 
See U. R. Civ. P. 9(c). 
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have violated the terms of his probation, and (2) he was mentally 
incompetent. 
Johnson did not allege either of these grounds for 
tolling the notice of claim period in his complaint. R. 1-10. As 
discussed in Point III below, Johnson had ample opportunity to 
amend his complaint to insert these allegations but failed to do 
so. Under these circumstances, the trial court's dismissal of 
Johnson's complaint was proper. 
Even considering Johnson's claims that he was on 
probation and was mentally incompetent, however, they are 
insufficient as a matter of law to toll the time period for filing 
a notice of claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(4) (a) (1989 Repl. 
Vol. 7A) sets forth the only basis on which the time for filing a 
notice of claim may be extended. It provides: 
If the claimant is under the age of 
majority, mentally incompetent and without a 
legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the 
claim arises, the claimant may apply to the 
court to extend the time for service of notice 
of claim/ 
Johnson makes no claim that he applied to the court for an 
extension of time to file the notice of claim. Moreover, even if 
he had so applied, his probation would not have been ground for an 
extension under section 63-30-11(4)(a). 
Johnson cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 as support for 
his contention that the time for filing his notice of claim was 
tolled by his mental incompetence. That section provides: 
4This section was amended effective April 29, 1991 to delete 
the words "or imprisoned." 
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If a person entitled to bring an action, other 
than for the recovery of real property, is at 
the time the cause of action accrued, either 
under the age of majority or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, the 
time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action• 
By its own express terms, section 78-12-36 applies only to the time 
limited "for the commencement of the action." Thus, even if 
section 78-12-36 applied to Johnson's claim against the state and 
its employee, it would operate only to extend the time for 
commencing a lawsuit, not for the condition precedent of filing a 
notice of claim. 
In Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 
P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that section 78-
12-36 did toll the notice of claim requirement for minority. 
However, that holding was based primarily on a finding of a 
"general legislative intent to protect the causes of minors" and a 
prior version of section 63-30-11. In 1978, the legislature 
amended section 63-30-11 to include the specific provisions of 
subsection 4 for the extension of the time for filing the notice of 
claim by application to the court. Scott was thus overruled. See 
Blum v. Stone, 752 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1988).5 
3In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 
1992), the Court addressed the incompetency provision of section 
78-12-36 in the context of both the statute of limitations and the 
notice of claim requirement. The Court did not, however, address 
the issue of whether that provision applied to the notice of claim 
requirement in light of the requirement under section 63-30-11 that 
the claimant apply to the court for an extension of time based on 
incompetency. 
In Scott, the Court also stated that to not toll the notice of 
claim requirement for minority would be a "denial of due process 
10 
Finally, the facts alleged by Johnson in support of his 
claim of mental incompetency are insufficient to toll the statute.6 
Johnson's contention was supported only by unauthenticated copies 
of two letters from a physician, both of which predated the 
incident that formed the basis of Johnson's complaint* R. 65, 102. 
The letters referred only vaguely to a "history of psychiatric 
problems" and a "history of schizophrenia." Id. Thus, Johnson's 
claimed "incompetency" did not even relate to the time period in 
question. Moreover, it fell far short of the standard of 
incompetency for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations. See 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Utah 
1991); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah App. 1990). 
Johnson failed to file notice of his claims against Smith 
and Bear River Social Services with the Attorney General. His 
claims are therefore barred. Johnson's claims are also barred 
because the notice he allegedly sent to Smith was admittedly 
untimely and the time period for filing such notice was not tolled 
either by his probation or his incompetency. The trial court's 
and equal protection." 568 P.2d at 748. This constitutional 
concern is allayed under the current version of section 63-30-11 
because, as already pointed out, the time for filing the notice of 
claim may be extended by application to the court. In any event, 
however, Johnson has not challenged the constitutionality of the 
notice of claim requirement as applied to a mentally incompetent 
person. Therefore, this Court should not address that issue here. 
6In considering a motion to dismiss, the court need consider 
only the "well-pleaded facts" of the complaint and the inferences 
from those facts, and may disregard conclusory allegations. See, 
C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 
1357, pp. 311-320. 
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order dismissing Johnson's claims against Smith and Bear River 
Social Services should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT II 
BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES IS IMMUNE FROM 
LIABILITY FOR A CLAIM BASED ON THE INTENTIONAL 
ACT OF ITS EMPLOYEE 
Section 63-30-3 (1989 Repl. Vol 9A)7 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act sets forth a broad, all encompassing 
grant to governmental entities of immunity from suit: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function . 
Thus, any suit against a governmental entity must be based on a 
waiver of immunity in some other provision of the Act. No such 
waiver applies to Johnson's claims here. 
Section 63-30-10 (1989 Repl. Vol 7A) contains a waiver of 
immunity for the "negligent act or omission" of an employee, but it 
is inapplicable here. Johnson's claim of breach of confidentiality 
is based on the disclosure to the police of his "reapplication for 
7This section was amended effective April 29, 1991. The 
amendments are not pertinent here. 
8The term "governmental function" is defined broadly in 
section 63-30-2 as 
any act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the 
act, failure to act, operation, function or undertaking 
is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a 
government or governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
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assistance form," R. 1-10. Under the circumstances of this case 
as alleged by Johnson, that disclosure was clearly intentional. 
The medicaid form contained a handwritten threat to kill an 
attorney, judge and doctor and Smith disclosed the form to the 
police. R. 5. Thus, section 63-30-10 does not apply. 
There being no waiver of governmental immunity applicable 
to Johnson's claims, the trial court's dismissal of Johnson's 
complaint against Bear River Social Services should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
JOHNSON'S CLAIM AGAINST SMITH IS BARRED ABSENT 
FRAUD OR MALICE 
Section 63-30-4(4) (1989 Repl. Vol. 7A) of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act provides: 
An employee may be joined in an action against 
a governmental entity in a representative 
capacity if the act or omission complained of 
is one for which the governmental entity may 
be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment or under color of authority, unless 
it is established tht the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
As shown above, Bear River Social Services is immune from liability 
for Johnson's claims. Thus, under 63-30-4(4), Smith may not be 
sued for those claims in her representative capacity. 
Neither may Smith be sued in a personal capacity absent 
fraud or malice. Here, Johnson did not allege either fraud or 
malice in his complaint. In response to Smith's motion to dismiss, 
Johnson argued that he could amend his complaint to insert the word 
"malicious." Since Smith and Bear River Social Services never 
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filed an answer to Johnson's complaint, under Rule 15(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Johnson could have amended his 
complaint as a matter of right. See Heritage Bank & Trust v. 
Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah App. 1989)(motion to dismiss is 
not a responsive pleading under U. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).9 Despite 
ample opportunity to do so, Johnson never filed an amended 
complaint alleging that Smith acted with fraud or malice.10 
Johnson having failed to allege either fraud or malice, 
the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Smith should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson failed to file notice of his claims against Smith 
and Bear River Social Services in accordance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Those claims are therefore barred. In 
addition, Bear River Social Services is immune from Johnson's claim 
of an intentional breach of confidentiality under the Act. Nor may 
Smith be held liable for such a claim absent any allegation of 
9This is true even though other defendants filed answers to 
Johnson's complaint. See 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 1481 at p. 578-79. See also Heritage Bank 
& Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d at 1011 (relying on federal authorities 
in construing U. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). 
10Arguably, an amended complaint with only a conclusory 
allegation that Smith acted with fraud or malice would not have 
saved Johnson's claim. Again, in considering a motion to dismiss, 
the court need consider only the "well-pleaded facts" of the 
complaint and the inferences from those facts, and may disregard 
such conclusory allegations. See, C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1357, pp. 311-320. The specific 
facts of this case as pled by Johnson — the disclosure of a death 
threat to the police — negate any inference of fraud or malice. 
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fraud or malice. The trial court's order dismissing Johnson's 
claims should be affirmed. >^~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IA day of March, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Atto^ fiey C^neral 
DEBRA J./MOORE 
Assistant: Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Gordon E. Johnson, pro se, 216 West 1st North, Brigham City, Utah 
84302, this /<P> day of March, 1992. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — S 
— Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if t 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be 
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises, 
the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
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BRIGHAH DISTRICT 
Jul I 2 «PH '91 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - #3312 
Attorney General 
EDWARD 0- OGILVIE - #2452 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS TO DEFENDANTS, 
vs. j CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER : 
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER, 
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L. : Civil No, 900000339 
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON, 
I 
Defendants. 
BE IT KNOWN in this matter that Defendant, Carolyn 
Smith, Bear River Social Services, having filed a motion to 
dismiss; and having submitted affidavits and a memorandum in 
support thereof; and the Court having reviewed the motion and 
materials filed in support of said motion hereby finds as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory 
Notice of Claim Requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
11 (1953), requiring that notice of claim be filed with the 
Attorney General and the Agency concerned within one year after 
the claim arose; ^ 
Case wo. 
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2. That Defendant Carolyn Smith, acted within the scope 
and course of her employment as an employee of the State of Utah, 
Bear River Social Services, and may not be sued in her personal 
capacity, plaintiff having made no allegation, and the record 
containing no evidence to indicate the existence of possible 
fraud or malice as required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-4 (1953), a 
section of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Carolyn E. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss is granted and 
Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants Carolyn Smith, Bear 
River Social Services, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this
 %>g day of^h/faL, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
rYi/, rlrt *ff 4Jt &\^ 
F . L . GUNNELL 
First District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO 
DEFENDANTS, CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES, postage 
prepaid, this 1/7 day of May, 1991, to the following: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 1st North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
Of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO 
DEFENDANTS, CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER SOCIAL SERVICES, postage 
prepaid, this b' day of May, 1991, to the following: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 1st North 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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Dale J. Lambert, 1871 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Jon J, Bunderson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON E. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROLYN SMITH, BEAR RIVER 
SOCIAL SERVICES, MARY MILLER, 
DOUGLAS MILLER, MICHAEL L. 
MILLER, and JON J. BUNDERSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900000339 
The Court, having reviewed the material on file in this matter, 
and good cause appearing therefore, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's claims against all 
defendants are dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56, the Court finds plaintiff's claims against defendant Jon 
Bunderson were without merit and not brought in good faith. 
Accordingly, defendant Bunderson is awarded reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred in defending plaintiff's claims against him. The 
Court finds that $1725.50 in fees and $101.41 in costs have 
reasonably been expended in defending Bunderson against plaintiff's 
MtCRGFUMED 
•r ^  ,*i B-.it KI«. r* a 
$£P 3 0 1991 ^ 
claims, and hereby enters judgment in favor of Bunderson and against 
plaintiff in the amount of $1826.91. 
DATED this SO day of IsAtph t7)Lut J 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
<^k$^^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the *2(Xh day of September, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed, 
postage prepaid to: 
Gordon E. Johnson 
216 West 100 North 
Brigham City, Utah 843 02 
Pro se plaintiff 
Michael L. Miller 
20 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 399 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Defendant Mary Miller 
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